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BOOKS RECEIVED
Virtual Justice: The Flawed Prosecution of Crime in
America. By H. Richard Uviller. New Haven, Connecticut;
London, England: Yale University Press. 1996. Pp. 318.
Hardcover.
Over a year after the conclusion of the O.J. Simpson
criminal trial, the American criminal justice system remains
the focus of great debate. Among the central issues: Does the
current criminal justice system properly balance the rights of
accused criminals with those of victims and society at large?
Does the system provide the proper tools for juries comprised
of ordinary citizens to adequately and fairly determine what
constitutes justice? Do esoteric procedural rules and judicial
precedents ultimately obfuscate the truth or are they a viable
method of protecting the wrongly accused from the enormous
power of the state?
Add Virtual Justice, The Flawed Prosecution of Crime in
America, by H. Richard Uviller, to the cacophony of opinions
regarding the current state of the American criminal justice
system. What sets Virtual Justice apart from most of the
high profile books addressing the topic is its honest and objec-
tive appraisal of the process at the core of the system. Focus-
ing on criminal procedure rather than legislative "get tough
on crime" trends or the inevitable problems of bad cops, poor
judges and incompetent juries, Virtual Justice provides a
fresh voice to an old debate. By never directly addressing the
Simpson trial, Virtual Justice divorces itself from the particu-
lar passions (and commercialism) surrounding that trial, of-
fering a more cerebral analysis of American criminal justice.
Many, particularly members of the criminal defense bar,
will vigorously dissent from the author's well-argued opinion
that the American criminal justice system offers "virtual" jus-
tice, palatable to most, most of the time, but ultimately pro-
viding less than the "actual" justice it purports to deliver.
Uviller believes the current process acquits too many guilty
defendants while convicting too many of the innocent. Con-
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cluding that despite the good faith intentions of its framers
and practitioners, the American criminal justice system is a
"sham" that lulls people into a false sense of faith, the author
posits that the system must be redesigned to justify the belief
that our justice system is the proudest accomplishment of our
democratic society.
Arranged into fourteen chapters, each addressing a dis-
tinct area of the justice system, Virtual Justice is, above all,
eminently readable. Most chapters begin with a brief, fic-
tional vignette designed as a paradigm of a discrete issue
arising in criminal cases. Following a review of the major
legislative, judicial and ethical rules evoked by his paradigm,
Uviller applies these rules to his vignette to reach the prob-
able outcome. In the process, the author effectively identifies
many of the inconsistencies, non-sequiturs and outright con-
tradictions arising from the application of procedural rules to
typical cases. After analyzing the efficacy of the probable re-
sult, Uviller concludes with suggested solutions to the conun-
drums presented.
Among the author's most incisive criticisms are those
pertaining to the exclusionary rule, the right to counsel, and
jury selection. In chapter four: 'The Exclusionary Rule: The
Fabled Doctrine, Its Baleful Side Effects, and a Generally Ig-
nored Technological Remedy," Uviller notes that the end re-
sult of the exclusionary rule is to deprive juries of probative
evidence that might assist them in rendering an accurate ver-
dict. Disheartened by this effect, the author notes approv-
ingly current legislative efforts to codify a true "good faith"
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
Such legislation, if accepted by the Supreme Court, would
provide that evidence obtained, with or without a warrant,
should not be excluded if the officer reasonably believed the
search lawful.
The rationale supporting such a broad good faith excep-
tion in the absence of a warrant is that the deterrent policy
behind the exclusionary rule cannot work when an officer rea-
sonably believes his search is lawful. However, Uviller fails
to recognize that, without having to first record for magis-
trate approval the supporting probable cause, place to be
searched, and particular items to be seized, there is nothing
to prevent police from engaging in ex-post facto justifications
that there was a "reasonable" belief in the lawfulness of a
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search. It is much easier to provide (or contrive) a probable
cause rationale after definitively knowing what was found
than it is before you actually find it, as is currently required.
Aside from enacting a true good-faith requirement, effec-
tively eviscerating the exclusionary rule, the author suggests
a more pragmatic solution to alleviate the often harsh result
of the exclusionary rule. Observing that the hassle involved
in going to the courthouse, typing an affidavit, finding a pros-
ecutor to approve it, and waiting for a judge who has time to
read it, is frequently why police officers fail to obtain war-
rants before conducting searches, the author suggests a tech-
nological cure: Eradicate such logistical impediments by in-
stituting a "radio warrant" system. The Fourth Amendment
requires a supporting statement "on oath or affirmation" but
makes no reference to a written affidavit.
Installing a three-way radio link between police cars, "on
duty" magistrates, and prosecutors, removes the logistical
impediments to obtaining warrants. The judge could place
the officer under oath over the radio and ask questions to as-
certain probable cause. The officer would have a blank pad of
warrants in his vehicle to use once permission was granted.
A recording of the conversation would be made in case the
procedure was later challenged in court. The author notes
that San Diego is currently the only jurisdiction to have fully
implemented such a program, but that courts addressing the
issue have unanimously upheld its legality. Uviller believes
prosecutors have stymied the widespread adoption of this
technique out of fear that it marginalizes their control over
the investigative process.
Chapter seven, "The Right to Counsel: Dramatic, Deceit-
ful, and Dilatory Assistance," begins with a vignette in which
a Senator is indicted for racketeering. With strong evidence
against him and his seat at stake, the Senator seeks the
assistance of an attorney he believes can effectively reinsti-
tute his reputation by conducting a media campaign decrying
the "false, politically motivated" accusations against the Sen-
ator. The attorney, after securing a right of first-refusal for
an exclusive book on the case, accepts the Senator as a client.
Although she conducts a successful media campaign, the at-
torney does not have any experience with white collar crimi-
nal cases. The attorney elicits evidence damaging to her cli-
ent and fails to capitalize on several opportunities to make
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favorable points for her client. Finally, the Senator's attor-
ney presents a surprise witness that makes the case more
sensational (better for the book), but actually hurts what is
already a weak case. The obvious result is that the Senator is
convicted.
With this vignette as his vehicle, the author persuasively
presents the problem of questionable legal ethics and possible
ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a review of rele-
vant ethical cannons and judicial decisions, Uviller questions
when, if ever, a judge should step in to prevent a defendant
from becoming a victim of his own attorney's incompetence.
Although in his vignette the book deal was clearly unethical,
and the representation obviously deficient, the author notes
that Strickland v. Washington makes it extremely unlikely
that an appellate court will find an attorney's representation
inadequate as a matter of law. Bemoaning the fact that
judges are loath to relieve obviously ineffective counsel at the
trial stage, Uviller presents several theories as to why this is
the case. The predominate reason: Judges know that incom-
petent lawyers frequently win cases because of showmanship.
Why should a judge deprive a defendant of an opportunity to
win a case by counsel of his own choosing? Overall, Uviller
effectively demonstrates that such rationales only contribute
to virtual justice. The ultimate result becomes the para-
mount goal rather than a fair process that reveals the actual
truth.
Uviller's criticism of the American criminal process is
particularly forceful when he discusses the jury selection pro-
cess in chapter ten, "Picking the Jury: Stacking the Ran-
domly Drawn Panel." Here the author's vignette depicts a
young defense attorney relying on personal biases, untested
generalizations, and irrational guesswork in selecting a jury
for a racially sensitive case. The author effectively demon-
strates how preemptory challenges are incompatible with the
notion of a jury comprised of "a randomly drawn panel of citi-
zens of all stripes." Uviller convincingly argues that allowing
the judge to excuse jurors "for cause" and providing counsel
with one or two preemptory challenges to remove obviously
unfit jurors better fits the egalitarian aspirations of our jury
system.
Despite its generally critical tone, Virtual Justice is not a
blanket condemnation of the criminal justice system. Even
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Uviller, a former prosecutor and a professor of law at Colum-
bia University, concedes that in at least some instances, the
virtual justice he generally decries is preferable to actual jus-
tice. For instance, in chapter nine, "Plea-Bargaining: Cheap
Crimes, Costly Trials," Uviller reluctantly admits that de-
spite the virtual justice which results from plea-bargains-
given that innocent defendant's which face unfavorable evi-
dence may plead guilty-the efficiency, provided by plea-bar-
gaining is a necessary alternative to actual justice. However,
such admissions debilitate the author's overall thesis-that
"truth" must be the paramount aim of the justice system.
Although the vignettes effectively raise the issues he
wishes to cover, Uviller's fictional writing is rigid at best.
Readers are unlikely to forget that Uviller is first and fore-
most an academic, not a novelist. The adage "truth is stran-
ger than fiction," is particularly applicable where criminal
cases are concerned. With a little research, Uviller might
well have located true stories that effectively, and perhaps
more poignantly, illustrate his procedural points. Moreover,
those familiar with criminal procedure will find many of the
vignettes and much of the background perfunctory. Never-
theless, even seasoned practitioners should find the author's
analysis and critique of the application of criminal procedure
to his proffered vignettes illuminating. Although many will
disagree with his opinions, the author aptly identifies many
of the most troublesome areas present in the American jus-
tice process.
The most frustrating aspect of Virtual Justice is the au-
thor's failure to support his analysis with source notation.
The author defends this omission by asserting that he does
not intend Virtual Justice to be a scholarly work. But by not
including footnotes or even a bibliography, Uviller marginal-
izes his own arguments and frequently misses opportunities
to bolster his assertions with statistical cites and verifiable
real world examples. This weakness is especially glaring in
the frequently encountered segments where the author as-
serts that statistics support his claim. The matter could have
been cured through the inclusion of endnotes without dis-
couraging casual readers who could skip over such notes at
their leisure.
One area where Uviller's assertions could be strength-
ened by citation is his claim that "in as many as ten percent
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of the cases" a judge faces the dilemma of sentencing an indi-
vidual who the judge believes may be innocent, despite a
jury's conviction. The author's solution to this unsupported
assertion is to allow the judge to participate in fact finding.
But without citing a single real example, Uviller's entire ar-
gument looses steam. Furthermore, Uviller offers little evi-
dence-beyond his own vignette depicting a judge con-
fronting just such a situation-that in such situations a
judge's conclusion of innocence is stronger than twelve jurors
unanimous determination of guilt.
True, in chapter twelve, "Of Witnesses and Jurors: A
Tale of Confidence and Error", the author sets forth his belief
that rules of evidence, especially those relating to credibility
and impeachment, serve more often to confuse juries than to
reveal the truth. His point is that while the confrontational
system may serve the process of determining actual guilt or
innocence well where skilled and scrupulous attorneys repre-
sent the parties, more often than not one or both attorneys
are not competent or scrupulous. It is in these all too typical
situations that the author laments that judges are not al-
lowed a more active role. The author believes a disinterested
magistrate could impartially uncover evidence for both sides
and examine witnesses to better illustrate the truth for the
jury.
In advocating an inquisitorial justice system, with the
judge as the primary fact finder, no "coaching" of witnesses
prior to testimony, and few procedural rules excluding proba-
tive evidence, the author reveals his distrust of the current
confrontational system's ability to lead jurors to the truth.
However, again Uviller is unable to offer any indication that
"correct" results are reached any more frequently under the
adapted continental inquisitorial model he advocates. In-
deed, all the author can claim (again without citation), is that
"those who use a modified inquisitorial method say the inno-
cent are rarely prosecuted at the end of a fair trial, and of
those that are, no more are convicted than under an adver-
sary system." Although Uviller asserts that such claims
"should not be lightly dismissed," without more, how are we
to conclude that a different system would provide any more
actual justice?
The conclusion to Virtual Justice concedes that many of
the author's proposals are unlikely to be embraced by an
[Vol. 37290
BOOKS RECEIVED
American society with deep political, historical and cultural
ties to the confrontational jury system. But the author suc-
ceeds in his larger goal: Illuminating some of the major flaws
present in the American justice system. Although many of
the solutions Uviller proposes are not viable alternatives,
others, such as simplifying warrant procedures and limiting
the use of preemptory challenges, are workable solutions
whose adoption would bring America's virtual justice closer
to actual justice.
Despite its weaknesses, Virtual Justice admirably expli-
cates and critiques many of the nuances of the criminal jus-
tice system. At the same time, the book is often relegated to
the "legal" section of bookstores and libraries, and one must
wonder whether it will ever reach its best audience, the gen-
eral public. This is unfortunate because, although this
reader disagrees with many of the book's arguments, it is
rare that such an insightful explication and critique of the
American criminal justice system is made so accessible.
A License to Steal: The Forfeiture of Property. By Leo-
nard W. Levy. Chapel Hill, North Carolina; London England:
The University of North Carolina Press. 1996. Pp. 272.
Hardcover.
In Hamden, Connecticut, an elderly couple's house is
seized after the government finds drugs in the grandson's
room. A retiree from Ventura, Iowa is convicted and fined for
illegal fishing. Not satisfied, state wildlife agents proceed to
seize the retiree's $6,000 boat. In Portland, Oregon, a man
loses a $40,000 car to the government following his arrest for
soliciting a prostitute. If caught on foot, the statute author-
ized only a $100 fine.
Welcome to the confusing world of asset forfeiture. Are
such government seizures an effective deterrent to crime and
proper restitution to a victimized society, or are they a funda-
mentally unfair abuse of civil liberty and property rights?
Professor Leonard Levy maintains the latter in his book, A
License to Steal: The Forfeiture of Property. As its title im-
plies, A License to Steal emphatically argues that, at least in
the area of forfeiture, America has gone too far in its never-
ending battle against crime. Pointing to cases such as those
described above, Levy concludes that the results of current
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forfeiture laws are not only frequently unjust, but by dimin-
ishing established constitutional rights they undermine soci-
ety as a whole.
Well-researched and meticulously documented, A License
to Steal is an excellent scholarly expos6. Levy outlines the
historical and legal underpinnings of criminal and civil forfei-
ture laws, buttressed with examples of their historical appli-
cation. Presenting arguments from opponents and propo-
nents alike, Levy effectively demonstrates why our forfeiture
laws require reform. The author's concluding evaluation of
competing forfeiture reform proposals currently under con-
gressional consideration suggests possible solutions, while
further illuminating the complexities of the issue.
Following some of the more egregious examples of gov-
ernment reliance on civil forfeiture to seize the personal and
real property of citizens, A License to Steal begins with a re-
view of the historical antecedents to civil forfeiture. Levy
first discusses the ancient doctrine of deodands. Stemming
from the Latin phrase "deo dandum" ("given to God"), the doc-
trine was first utilized by English monarchs as a method of
augmenting the Crown's treasury. Where an object was the
instrument of a wrong, deodands made that object the prop-
erty of the Crown, divesting the old owner of any property
rights in the object.
Although the practice of deodands and later, civil forfei-
ture, was frequently justified by Biblical references, Levy
aptly demonstrates the fallacy of such analogies. We learn
that Biblical "forfeiture" was quite different from deodands
and today's civil forfeiture. Exodus 21:28 commands that "If
an ox gore a man or a woman that they die, the ox shall be
surely stoned and its flesh shall not be eaten." Yet, in the
Bible, the object is deemed possessed and is destroyed rather
than forfeited to another, while under deodands and civil for-
feiture the sovereign is the beneficiary of the value of the
wrong-doing object. Levy aptly points out that today seized
property is not destroyed and its value is not returned to the
people but is retained by those in authority. Although Levy
fails to address the argument that under a democracy the
government is the people, he does demonstrate that the re-
suit of today's civil forfeiture is nevertheless nearly opposite
civil forfeiture's Biblical predecessor.
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The premise of deodands and civil forfeiture is the fiction
that inanimate objects can themselves be guilty of a wrong.
Such civil proceedings are termed "in rem" as opposed to "in
personam" since the property itself is prosecuted. Thus,
although the property must be shown to be connected to crim-
inal activity, no such showing is required against the owner.
Beyond leading to bizarre case names such as United States
v. One 1963 Cadillac Coupe de Ville Two Door,1 Levy la-
ments that this fiction has the unfortunate result of removing
most constitutional safeguards to civil forfeitures of property.
In civil forfeiture, the owner is frequently not charged
with a crime, let alone adjudged guilty. Owners thus receive
few constitutional protections in civil forfeiture proceedings
because in rem actions do not determine the guilt of an indi-
vidual-they do not technically constitute a punishment
which would trigger most constitutional protections. More-
over, in civil forfeiture cases the government is relieved of
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt" and need only establish a
reasonable connection between the property and the commis-
sion of a crime. The treatment of civil forfeitures as regula-
tory actions on the behalf of the public means that "the inno-
cent owner of property [is] deprived of [the property] without
a semblance of fair procedure."
Criminal forfeiture confiscates property used in or ac-
quired through the criminal activity for which an individual
is convicted. Unlike its in rem civil counterpart, a necessary
precursor to in personam criminal forfeiture is the conviction
of the person whose property is to be seized. Criminal forfei-
ture is not directed against the seized property itself, but is
part of the punishment of a person convicted of a crime. Ac-
cordingly, all constitutional protections afforded a criminal
defendant are present in criminal forfeiture proceedings.
Not surprisingly, we learn that criminal forfeiture was
traditionally disfavored by law enforcement, who preferred
the more lenient standards of civil forfeiture to seize prop-
erty. Moreover, although criminal forfeiture had a long and
established history in England, the fledging American colo-
nies were loath to apply criminal forfeiture against their citi-
zens. It was feared that strong forfeiture laws would induce
settlers to leave for competing colonies where forfeiture laws
1. 250 F.Supp. 183 (1966).
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were less severe. Compounding this inclination was the con-
cern that strong criminal forfeiture laws would deprive the
heirs of criminals of needed inheritance, forcing entire fami-
lies to become wards of the state.
Historically, long-standing legislative and judicial rules
marginalized the use of criminal forfeiture in the United
States. The First Congress enacted a statute prohibiting for-
feiture of entire estates and those that would deprive de-
scendants of inheritance. Until 1970 only limited criminal
forfeiture provisions remained on the books in the United
States, and even these were rarely used. Levy's initial de-
scription of criminal forfeiture is less incisive than that of
civil forfeiture, but this is not surprising given the strength of
the protections against criminal forfeiture compared to those
available in civil forfeiture proceedings.
With criminal forfeiture so restricted, why then did civil
forfeiture remain prevalent? Levy shows that the answer (or
at least the origins) can be found in admiralty law. Early
maritime courts adopted civil forfeiture as the preferred
method protecting the economic viability of a new nation. Us-
ing civil forfeiture, ships along with their cargo could be
seized for violating tariff and other revenue laws. The prece-
dent for later expansion of civil forfeiture was thus firmly es-
tablished. The United States Supreme Court justified such
civil forfeitures "as the only adequate means of suppressing
the offense or wrong." To Levy however, in rem forfeitures of
any variety, "like the deodands to which they were analogous,
were make-believe prosecutions of property in order to de-
prive the owners of their constitutional rights, thereby en-
abling the government to make confiscations not otherwise
likely."
However, in relying on and expanding civil forfeiture,
courts were eventually forced to concede an important point:
civil forfeiture was indeed a form of punishment against the
owner. This acknowledgment diminished the make-believe
aspect of forfeiture, but created a new problem. Courts now
needed to reconcile the paucity of constitutional protections
available in civil forfeiture cases with the admission that the
procedure has punitive aspects. Through direct citation to
numerous court opinions, Levy demonstrates a judicial ten-
dency to downplay or outright ignore this obvious contradic-
tion. Levy believes courts are able to engage in such "intellec-
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tual flim-flammery" because numerous Supreme Court
decisions afford property rights non-fundamental status. As
a result, potential constitutional infirmities of civil forfeiture
laws are easily dismissed as being of lesser magnitude than,
for example, the rights of accused felons.
Congress reintroduced criminal forfeiture in the 1970's
in legislation intended to strengthen law enforcement's' abil-
ity to fight organized crime. Levy notes that shortcomings of
the 1970's statutes, adverse court rulings, and most impor-
tantly, poor leadership by the Justice Department, led to the
ultimate failure of the 1970's criminal forfeiture legislation.
However, this failure only served as an impetus for further
legislation in the 1980's revitalizing criminal forfeiture.
Among the central provisions of the 1980's legislation: ex-
tending the scope of criminal forfeiture to reach more assets
over a broader variety of crimes and allowing law enforce-
ment to seize substitute assets when the criminal assets are
not located. Levy concludes that such provisions, in combina-
tion with the already potent civil forfeiture laws, gave the
government "potentially draconian forfeiture weapons."
Levy wastes no time returning to descriptions of forfeit-
ures exemplifying the government's abuse of its "draconian"
powers. Here Levy launches his attack against forfeiture
laws in earnest. Following a persuasive litany of questiona-
ble seizures, Levy asks why most law enforcement agencies,
from local police departments to the FBI, so adamantly sup-
port forfeiture laws? At least part of the answer stems from
generous provisions of the forfeiture laws allowing law en-
forcement to retain much of the proceeds from seizures.
Although such provisions are intended to benefit the commu-
nity directly affected by the criminal activity and compensate
law enforcement for a job well done, such incentives also lead
to abuse.
Most readers will be perturbed to learn that forfeiture
assets are being used by police departments to fund ban-
quets, huge fireworks displays, sports cars for police person-
nel and gold watches for retiring police secretaries. Although
much of the proceeds do fund legitimate police activities, nu-
merous documented abuses raise the question of whether po-
lice are targeting the most culpable offenders or merely the
most profitable. Doubts are only increased when we hear a
senior Customs official remark that given the choice between
1996] 295
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
"a guy with a ton of marijuana and no assets versus a guy
with two joints and a Lear jet, I guarantee you they'll bust
the guy with the Lear jet."
To Levy however, the most shocking feature of civil and
criminal forfeiture laws is their failure to adequately protect
the rights of innocent people. The likelihood of innocent peo-
ple becoming the victims of forfeiture are enhanced by provi-
sions providing informants with 25% of forfeiture proceeds.
Naturally, this encourages informants (often accused
criminals themselves) to choose the wealthiest targets re-
gardless of their guilt. Examples of individuals shot by police
acting on insufficient and inaccurate tips, while exceptional,
underline Levy's concern.
The relation-back doctrine is also a frequent cause of in-
nocent owners' loss of property. Applicable in all forfeiture
cases, relation-back allows the government to seize offending
property even if it is no longer owned by an individual with
knowledge of its criminal nature. In short, the government's
interest in such property extends back to the time of the
crime, giving the government superior title to the property
regardless who owns it at the time of seizure. Several safe-
guards are in place to protect truly innocent owners, but to
the author, the inadequacy of these protections are readily
apparent.
Because an owner's guilt or innocence is irrelevant in
civil forfeiture cases, innocent owner's are particularly vul-
nerable to civil forfeitures. All that the government must
show is that there is probable cause to believe the property
itself is related to a crime. Innocent owners may retain the
property, but usually only if they can show, by a preponder-
ance of evidence, that the property is not connected to a
crime. Not only does this force a higher burden of proof on
the owner than the government, it effectively means the prop-
erty is guilty until proven innocent. This reversal of the stan-
dard burden of proof is possible because in rem forfeitures are
civil actions, not criminal. Under the majority of civil forfei-
ture statutes, innocent owners can also prevail if they prove
they took all reasonable measures to prevent the misuse of
their property.
The high burden placed on owners by the "all reasonable
measures" test is emphasized by a United States Supreme
Court decision upholding the forfeiture of a yacht after a
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renter was caught smoking marijuana on the vessel. The
Court found that the owner did not take all reasonably pru-
dent steps to prevent illegal substances from being used on
the yacht. Furthermore, the Court felt forfeiture would teach
the owner to exercise greater caution before renting "in the
future." The Court did not elaborate on what measures
would constitute "prudent steps." Congress has lessened the
severity of the innocent owner's defense in a few forfeiture
statutes by requiring proof only that the owner neither knew
of nor agreed to the illegal use, but even this is difficult to
prove by a preponderance of evidence.
In criminal forfeiture cases, innocence is a complete de-
fense for the defendant and if established prohibits forfeiture.
But what about lien holders, bona fide purchasers and co-
owners who have legitimate third-party interests in crimi-
nally forfeited property? First, third parties have no stand-
ing in criminal forfeiture cases and are unable to petition for
a hearing until after a jury has returned a special verdict
awarding the property to the government. Since the govern-
ment has five years after seizure to decide whether to prose-
cute, the innocent third-party may be deprived of the prop-
erty for a considerable period. Second, once the third party
institutes an action, they can obtain their interest in the
property only if they establish by a preponderance of evidence
a legal interest in the property prior to the commission of the
crime leading to forfeiture.
If the third-party in a criminal forfeiture case can only
demonstrate an interest existing after the commission of the
crime, the relation-back doctrine technically gives them no
relief. In such cases, innocent third-parties cannot recover
even if they prove they had no knowledge of the property's
forfeitability. Although some courts have mitigated the
harsh effect of the relation-back doctrine by allowing inno-
cent third-parties to recover where they can show they were
bona fide purchasers for value and had no knowledge of the
crime, Levy poignantly demonstrates the inequity of the gen-
eral rule.
Levy also finds current forfeiture laws objectionable on
constitutional grounds. The Seventh and Eighth Amend-
ments, guaranteeing civil trials in cases involving more than
$20 and prohibiting excessive fines respectively, appear vio-
lated by summary civil forfeiture proceedings summarily con-
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fiscating property based on probable cause alone. In cases
where a criminal defendant's assets are seized through civil
forfeiture, Levy believes the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against double jeopardy is violated. Additionally, in both civil
and criminal forfeiture cases, government custody of a de-
fendant's assets before trial may interfere with the right to be
represented by counsel of choice. Levy presents strong argu-
ments on these and other fronts, which most courts have
skillfully side-stepped.
Levy is unlikely to be consoled by the Supreme Court's
most recent forfeiture decisions, released after the publica-
tion of A License to Steal. In United States v. Ursery,2 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that civil forfeitures are not puni-
tive unless they cannot reasonably be considered civil sanc-
tions. As a result, the Court found that an individual may
usually be prosecuted criminally and also have his assets
seized by civil forfeiture without violation of the Fifth
Amendment's double jeopardy clause. In another recent deci-
sion, Bennis v. Michigan,3 a 5-4 majority of the Court held
that an innocent owner's defense is not allowed under either
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the
Fifth Amendment's takings clause.
Despite his criticisms, Levy believes forfeiture laws are
frequently desirable, stating that "a critic of forfeiture laws
would be irrational to advocate their abolition.., no criminal
should be able to profit from crime." But Levy strongly feels
that fairness requires forfeiture laws be reformed. Levy is
not alone in this belief, and A License to Steal concludes with
a summary of several reform proposals currently being con-
sidered by Congress. All the proposals purportedly bring
greater fairness to forfeiture proceedings, but Levy differs in
his evaluation of each.
Levy considers Michigan Congressman John Conyers'
proposal ideal. Conyers' bill would abolish civil forfeiture al-
together, protecting innocent owners by securing proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt as the forfeiture standard. Conyers
would also prevent excessive punishment by requiring the
government to prove forfeitures are commensurate with the
crime. To avoid the abuse spawned by incentive programs,
Conyers would require state forfeiture proceeds be returned
2. 64 U.S.L.W. 4565 (1996).
3. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
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to state treasuries rather than directly to police departments.
At least 50% of federal forfeiture proceeds would be dedicated
to community-based crime-control programs. To provide
greater protection to innocent owners, the bill would abolish
the relation-back doctrine. Finally, Conyers' bill would en-
hance defendant's ability to pay for counsel and would open
the government to damage suits for wrongful seizures. How-
ever, Levy admits that Conyers bill is probably too radical
and concludes that its chances of passing are as unlikely as
"snow in the Tropics."
Meanwhile, Levy considers the proposal submitted by
the Department of Justice ("DOJ") as worse than no reform at
all. Simply put, the DOJ proposal "takes away more than it
offers." For instance, although the DOJ bill has the virtue of
establishing a standardized innocent owner's defense applica-
ble in both civil and criminal forfeiture proceedings, the test
the DOJ proposes is the most stringent possible. The DOJ
innocent owner defense would enact the burdensome test of
proving that one "did everything that reasonably could be ex-
pected" to prevent or terminate the illegal use of the property
before allowing an individual to retain seized property. The
DOJ also agrees that the government should bear the burden
of proof in civil forfeiture cases, but unlike other reform pro-
posals, suggests preponderance of evidence rather than clear
and convincing evidence as the appropriate standard. Fur-
thermore, the DOJ proposal would simultaneously reduce the
government's burden of proof in criminal forfeiture actions to
a preponderance of evidence standard.
The reform proposal most likely to pass is that submitted
by Illinois Representative Henry Hyde. However, Levy finds
Hyde's bill mostly cosmetic. The farthest reaching reforms
Hyde proposes are easing the burden of proof under the inno-
cent owner's defense, a higher clear and convincing evidence
standard for government civil forfeitures, and opening the
government to damage claims stemming from faulty seizures.
Although Levy is disappointed that extensive reforms such as
those proposed by Conyers are unlikely, he concludes that
real, if modest reform is possible. Levy foresees reform in
which every interest gains something and none is utterly de-
feated. However, Levy also predicts that the Judiciary Com-
mittee's occupation with a slew of other legislation could in-
definitely delay reform.
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Although tempered by the author's acknowledgment that
the extraordinary cases are the exception rather than the
rule in forfeiture actions, A License to Steal at times seems
sensationalistic. The author seldom discusses the procedural
intricacies or court-room battles involved in the numerous
forfeiture cases he cites beyond the ultimate, usually ques-
tionable, outcome. Rarely are instances of appropriate for-
feitures discussed, even though the author admits these com-
prise the majority of cases. Where such cases are mentioned,
such as the Bank of Credit and Commerce International
("BCCI") forfeiture of $550 million in assets or Michael
Milken's plea-bargained forfeiture of $600 million, they are
given relatively little attention. By delving deeper into both
egregious and proper forfeiture cases, Levy might have en-
hanced his arguments and provided greater perspective into
the complexities of the issue.
Despite its minor shortcomings, A License to Steal pro-
vides an account of forfeiture laws which is as engrossing as
it is disturbing. Whatever one's view on the issue, it is diffi-
cult to come away from this book without a better under-
standing of how forfeiture laws operate in the United States
along with a belief that at least some modicum of reform is
required to bring fundamental fairness to this powerful law
enforcement tool. As Congress considers forfeiture reform,
analyses such as Professor Levy's are sure to play a substan-
tial role. This book is highly recommended for anyone with
an interest in how the government can lawfully take property
from its citizens without providing full constitutional
protections.
Andrew R. Hull
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